Massimo Mugnai

From the beginning of his long philosophical career to the end of his

life, Leibniz seems to have never dismissed the intent - which, after various

pauses, he renewed with the regularity of a recurring dream - to compile

long lists of definitions. These lists had, in principle, two different aims: to

establish a firm ground for the building of a new encyclopedia and to re-

form the traditional doctrine of categories. Often in the same “table of defi-

nitions” these two aims intertwine. Sometimes the lists are quite short and

heterogeneous in content; sometimes they are long and homogeneous, but

with many repetitions; and, in general, they all exhibit an unaccomplished,

tentative quality which, however, do not diminish their philosophical inter-

est. These lists have been published in the Vorausedition or elsewhere; only

a handful of them is as yet unpublished.

In this paper I intend to draw attention to an unpublished list of defini-

tions which Leibniz wrote after 1700 and which almost exclusively contains

logical items and reflections on logical ontology. I will first give the original

Latin text (without the critical apparatus); then I will propose an English

translation of the most relevant passages; and finally I will present a short

commentary to the translated passages.

The Latin text (LH 7 C Bl. 76 v. A translation will be given of the

passages comprised between brackets “<” and “>”).

Alia est rerum alia terminorum divisio.

Terminus est cogitabile quod potest esse subiectum propositionis verae

estque vel implicans contradictionem, nempe chimaera, vel possibile seu

non implicans, nempe reale.

Reale est terminus possibilis seu distincte cogitabilis, ut homo, doctus,

causa, actio.

<Rursus terminus sumitur vel materialiter, et ita est ens, cuius diversi

termini sunt eadem res ut rex et propheta in Davide, nempe idem est rex


qui est propheta. Vel terminus sumitur formaliter, ut rex qua rex, nempe

etsi non sit alius rex quam propheta, tamen aliud est regem esse aliud

prophetam esse. David qua rex differt a Davide qua propheta. Diversi ergo

sunt termini sed ens idem. Interim in terminis quoque formaliter spectatis

distinctio est. Interdum enim in idem resolvuntur veluti figura triangula

et figura trilatera, item rectangulum aequilaterum et quadrilaterum ae-

quiforme, ubi nodo est eadem; interdum vero diversa notio est, ut aureum

et rotundum, etsi monetae conveniant quam ducatum vocamus. Termini

ergo differunt re, cum diversa entia spectant, forma cum ad diversas no-

tiones spectant, consideratione, cum diversa dicunt seu cogitanda exhibent.

Idem est quidam rex et quidam propheta, omne triangulum et omne tri-

laterum. Stemus ergo in rebus ipsasque notiones secundas ut res considere-


Terminus est vel Nihil ut Blitiri, vel aliquid.

Aliquid est subiectum propositionis verae, estque vel impossibile, quod

dicitur Chimaera, vel ens.

Ens est aliquid possibile, ut Deus, homo, scientia, scriptio, motus.

Ens vel est subsistens quod tantum subiectum esse potest, vel attribu-

, quod est constituens praedicati alterius entis ut scientia constituit ut

aliquis sit sciens. Actio ut agens. Sed nonne datur tertium? <Sic tempus, lo-

cus, neque est subsistens nec attributum. Idem est de numero, ordine. Sic

decem non est attributum ullius rei. Neque enim de aggregato neque de

singulis dici potest numerus denarius. Idem est de relatione quae commu-

nis, v. g. similitudo duorum. Datur itaque attributum quod est simul in

pluribus subiectis. Talia ergo sunt ordo, adeoque tempus et locus>.

A possible translation of the first passage between brackets:

Again a term is taken either materially, and thus it is a being the differ-

ent terms of which are the same thing, as king and prophet in David - i. e.

the same person who is a king is a prophet as well; or a term is taken for-

mally as a king insofar as he is a king - i. e. even though the king is not a

different person from the prophet, yet to be a king is different from being a

prophet. David, insofar as he is a king, differs from David insofar as he is a

prophet. Therefore the terms are different, but the being is the same. In

some circumstances, however, even the terms considered formally admit of

a distinction. In fact, by means of analysis, they give rise, sometimes, to the

same - as in the case of a triangular and a trilateral shape or in the case of

an equilateral rectangle and an equiform quadrilateral, where the notion is

the same; sometimes the notion is different, as in the case of “golden” and

“round”, even if both apply to the coin which we call “ducat”. Therefore

terms differ in the following way: about the thing - insofar as they concern

different beings; about the form - insofar as they concern different notions;

about the way of considering - insofar as they mention or show different

thoughts. A certain king and a certain prophet are the same, and so are ev-


ery triangle and every trilateral. Thus, we have to stay with things and to

consider as things all second notions as well.


As is well known, Leibniz’s use of “term” is quite puzzling. In our

text (in the part I have not translated), he defines a term as «something

which can be thought and which can be the subject in a true proposition».

This seems to be quite in agreement with the definition of a term as the

meaning of a word, which we find in a letter to Des Bosses of 1712.1 But in

the text under consideration, Leibniz plainly writes that Blitiri, which was

traditionally mentioned as a typical linguistic expression with no meaning,

is a term. Without excusing Leibniz’s inaccuracies in the use of the term

“term”, I think that we can easily explain these inaccuracies if we take into

account his peculiar attitude towards nominalism. In the period that dates

from the composition of the Dialogue 2 (1677) to that of New Essays 3

(1704-5), Leibniz firmly claims that men cannot think without signs -

whether they be written or spoken words, letters or numbers, or simply

mental images or perceptions of some sort. At the same time, Leibniz rec-

ognizes that words and other signs are meaningful only if they express some

idea or ideas. The point is that men cannot have - with the exception of a

handful of cases - direct access to ideas (in particular if the ideas are suffi-

ciently complex): the psychological act of grasping an idea - an act which

gives rise to what Leibniz calls a “concept” - is always associated in our

mind with the use of words or other signs.4 Thus language is something

which interposes itself between the realm of ideas and us; and our thoughts

are, for the most part, “blind thoughts” (cogitationes caecae) made of words

(or of other signs).5 In this sense, words are concepts or, better said, substi-

tutes for concepts. It is not inappropriate to think that this point of view in-

duced Leibniz to use the expression “term” in a quite inaccurate way,

which blurs the differences between conceptual content and its linguistic

expression. At any rate it seems not too far from the spirit - if not from the

literal meaning - of Leibniz’s writings to consider a term as a meaningful

linguistic expression. Therefore we can re-define a term in a Leibnizian

sense as a linguistic expression associated with a meaning, which can be the


subject (or predicate) in a sentence. That an expression is meaningful does

not necessarily imply, however, that it is associated with a concept or an

idea. If I read or hear the compound name “round-square”, I am certainly

able to understand the meaning of the two composing words “round” and

“square” and I am also able to understand that the compound refers to

something which is, simultaneously, round and square. But in this case nei-

ther a thing nor an idea corresponds to the compound word, because the

expression “round-square” gives rise to a contradiction.6

Terms - as Leibniz writes in our text - may be considered in three

different ways: 1) from the extensional point of view, simply taking into ac-

count the object (or objects) which fall under them; 2) in a formal way,

looking at their intension or conceptual content; 3) according to the pecu-

liar way in which they «mention or show different thoughts». Leibniz char-

acterizes the first way of considering terms by means of the expression

“materially” (materialiter), which is strongly reminiscent of the “material

supposition” and of the analogous “taking a term materially” of the

scholastic logicians.7 However “materially” here alludes not to the linguis-

tic structure or grammatical form of the term itself - according to its pre-

vailing meaning in medieval times - but to the subject matter or “thing” to

which the term properly refers. Even though terms - with the exception of

proper names - name properties or peculiar aspects of things - as, for in-

stance, “yellow” or “round” or “man” - they refer, insofar as we consider

them materially, to the things themselves to which the properties are at-

tributed. As clearly emerges from General Inquiries, for Leibniz there is no

difference between adjectives and substantives: both have the same logical

structure, the same “predicative character”, and hence both presuppose a

thing (or several things) of which they are the predicates.8 The logical

structure of “yellow” or of “man”, for example, is interpreted by Leibniz as

implying something - a concrete thing - which is respectively yellow or a

man. Thus, different terms may refer to the same individual. Leibniz’s ex-

ample is that of “king” and “prophet”, which, in the case of the Biblical

David, have identical denotation.


Terms, however, even though referring to the same object, may differ

formally - i. e. regarding form, insofar as they mention different properties

or different aspects of the given object. Even though David, the individual,

is both a king and a prophet, being a king is a different property from that

of being a prophet. Here Leibniz uses “formally” (formaliter) in sharp con-

trast to “materially” (materialiter) with the aim of distinguishing the form -

or intension or conceptual content - of a term, from its matter or extension.

In a short commentary to a book by the Jesuit Aloys Kümmet (edited in

1706), Leibniz sketches an analogous distinction between things and


Thus things which are really distinct usually are distinguished by

means of the senses, whereas things which differ in concept - i. e. those

which differ in their formalities, even though they are not really different -

are distinguished by the mind. On a plane, for example, the triangle and

the trilateral are not two different things, but differ in concept only; there-

fore they are the same thing really, not formally. 9

Thus, terms are said to differ formally, because they differ in their formali-

The word “formality” (formalitas) is typical of the Scotist tradition, but

it cannot be assumed as evidence of any scotistic influence on Leibniz’s phi-

losophy. As is well known, in Leibniz’s time the current scholastic doctrines

were characterized by an eclectic attitude which blurred the borders be-

tween the different philosophical positions. Therefore, even if an expression

is typical of a certain philosophical milieu, from its use one cannot automat-

ically infer that the user adhered to the theses commonly held by people be-

longing to that milieu.

In a revealing passage of the New Essays, which is also very important for

setting the terminological distinction between extension and intension of a

term, “formality” is explicitly held by Leibniz as a synonym of the word “idea”:

... when I say Every man is an animal I mean that all men are included

amongst all the animals; but at the same time I mean that the idea of animal

is included in the idea of man. “Animal” comprises more individual than

“man” does, but “man” comprises more ideas or more formalities: one has

more instances, the other more degrees of reality: one has the greater exten-

sion the other the greater intension. 10


Hence we may paraphrase what Leibniz writes on formalities saying that

terms which differ formally are different in virtue of their conceptual con-

tent and that not all conceptual distinctions give rise to real distinctions (a

conclusion which maintains a Scotist flavour as well).

Till now I have attempted to illustrate what Leibniz properly means

by the first two ways of considering a term, out of the three mentioned

above. The task has been not particularly difficult, because there are many

other texts in which Leibniz proposes or discusses the distinction between

these two different ways. Problems arise, however, with the “third way”,

which seems to have been explicitly recognized only in our text. As Leibniz

observes, terms considered formally may express the same conceptual con-

tent in a different guise. And what the “third way” of considering a term

takes into account is precisely the guise or manner in which a term “ar-

ranges” or “presents” a given conceptual content. Clearly, this “arrange-

ment” or “presentation” must depend partly on language - i. e. on the dif-

ferent possibilities we have of expressing the different aspects of an idea. At

the same time it seems to depend also on the fact that a term expresses a

complex idea or formality. If two terms express the same simple idea - i. e.

an idea which cannot be further analyzable - then they name the same

thought in different ways and do not «mention or show different thoughts»

(as Leibniz writes).

Leibniz tries to clarify this point with his standard example of the terms

“triangle” and “trilateral”. “Triangle” and “trilateral” differ from each

other because they represent different ways of considering the same idea (i.

e. that of a geometrical figure with three sides and three angles). “Triangle”

and “trilateral” are not different formalities, but simply different ways of

thinking of the same formality. That the formality is the same - Leibniz

claims - can easily be shown by means of conceptual analysis: if we proceed

to analyse the concept corresponding to “triangle” we individuate a set of

basic notions or ideas which characterize the concept corresponding to “tri-

lateral” as well.

In our text the formalities are objective, independent of the different

ways in which we can consider them, whereas the “way of considering”

gives rise to different expressions of the same formality. Thus, the third way

of considering a term seems to be determined by the way (or ways) in

which the formalities are considered by the mind. As I observed above, this

is apparently the only text in which Leibniz makes this claim, and what is

puzzling about it is that it seems to be in neat contrast with Leibniz’s main

doctrine on formalities. If we look again at the passage previously quoted

from Leibniz’s commentary on Kümmet’s book, we see that the two terms


“triangle” and “trilateral” are there assumed plainly to express two differ-

ent formalities
, not two different ways of considering the same formality. In

Leibniz’s words, “triangle” and “trilateral” «are the same thing really, not

formally».11 One can hope for more light looking at another passage from

New Essays, in which the “triangle-trilateral” issue is explicitly considered:

... someone who said The triangle and the trilateral are not the same

would be wrong, since if we consider it carefully we find that three sides

and three angles always go together... However, one can still say in the ab-

stract that triangularity is not trilaterality, or that the formai causes of the

triangle and of the trilateral are not the same, as the philosophers put it.

They are different aspects of one and the same thing. 12

“Triangularity” and “trilaterality” are said to be “the formal causes” (but a

more litteral translation would be: “the formal reasons”) respectively, of the

triangle and of the trilateral; and they are “different aspects of one and the

same thing”. In this case too, Leibniz seems to agree that “triangle” and

“trilateral” correspond to two different formalities. What is the same is not

the idea, but the “thing” - presumably all the concrete instances of trian-

gles, which are, simultaneously, triangular and trilateral.

As Benson Mates observes, the “triangle-trilateral” issue is also of some

importance for understanding Leibniz’s attitude towards the substitutivity

principle salva veritate (and, hence, Leibniz’s attitude towards identity).13

The expressions “triangle” and “trilateral” are Leibniz’s favourite examples

for showing that, in some peculiar contexts, the substitutivity principle fails.

And, if we look at the way in which Leibniz characterizes these contexts,

we can gain precious hints concerning formalities. Consider, for example,

the following passage from a text written about 1686:

A = B means that A and B are the same - i. e. that one can be substi-

tuted for the other anywhere. (Unless it is precluded, as happens in those

contexts in which one states that a given term is considered in a peculiar re-

spect. For instance: even though the triangle and the trilateral are identical,

if one states The triangle insofar as it is a triangle has 180 degrees, one can-

not substitute trilateral for triangle. Here there is something material which

precludes the substitution). 14


What is interesting here is, first of all, Leibniz’s use of the expression “ma-

terial”, which has, in this circumstance, a meaning very near to that of the

medieval tradition, as opposed to the meaning considered above. Second,

we may observe that preventing the substitutivity in the given context is the

fact that a term is considered in a peculiar respect. Once more it is the way

of considering
which puts in evidence the formal difference between two

terms, which are (the formai difference notwithstanding) identical. In Gen-

eral Inquiries
, propositions which do not allow the substitutivity of equiva-

lents are called “formal” and “reflexive”: they «assume one of the coinci-

dentials in such a way that it is distinguished from the others» and they «do

not so much speak about a thing, as about our way of conceiving it» 15 (em-

phasis mine). Similarly, in a text on geometry written about the same time

as General Inquiries, Leibniz writes a short remark with the aim of empha-

sizing that the substitutivity principle for terms holds in all the propositions

which are “direct” (directae) - i. e. in all those propositions «which do not

take into account the way of considering (nec in ipsum considerandi modum

)».16 Thus, Leibniz seems to be claiming that the concept corre-

sponding to “triangle” is different from that corresponding to “trilateral”

(their formalities are different); and, consequently, he seems to assume: 1)

that it is the way of considering the denotation of a term that gives rise to a

formality; 2) that his salva veritate principle provides a criterion for the

identity of things not of concepts.

Therefore, the problem arises of how to evaluate the position as-

sumed by Leibniz in our text. If the “third way” of considering a term is

explicitly mentioned only here, then one may argue that it is something

which does not correspond to Leibniz’s prevailing view. And hence it can

be assumed to be a position held on this occasion and suddenly dismissed.

But it seems to me that this is not so. I have the impression that what we

see here is Leibniz’s ambiguous attitude towards nominalism. The ambigu-

ity consists mainly of Leibniz’s acceptance of the existence of ideas and

essences of things, on the one hand, and of his simultaneous adhesion, on

the other, to a kind of cautious nominalism which undermines the impor-

tance of abstract terms and ideas, on the other.17

At the beginning of General Inquiries, for example, Leibniz claims that

the fact that “triangle” and “trilateral” coincide can easily be shown by


means of analysis, and states in a odd way the following general principle

about logical coincidence: if terms «are analysed until it appears a priori

that they are possible, and if the same terms appear formally, then different

terms are the same».18 Given two terms A and B, they coincide «if the one

can be substituted in place of the other without loss of truth, or if, on

analysing each of the two by substitution of their values (i. e. of their defini-

tions) in place of the terms, the same terms appear on both sides».19 As

Leibniz specifies, “the same terms” means “the same formally- i. e. at the

end of the analysis it is necessary that on both sides of the copula the same

formalities or ideas appear as component parts of A and B: «the same I

mean, formally - for example, if L, M and N appear on both sides».20 Here

Leibniz seems to hold a point of view quite similar to that of our list of

definitions: terms like “triangle” and “trilateral” have the same ideal or

conceptual content. Presumably, then, they are not different formalities, but

simply different ways of expressing the same formalities or the same finite

set of ideas.

That “triangle” and “trilateral” are different espressions of the same

idea can be inferred as well from the following short passage from New


... I have remarked earlier that there are redundant ways of expressing

ideas, which add nothing to things. It is as though someone were to say “By

Triquetrum I mean a trilateral triangle” and to infer from that that some tri-

laterals are not triangular. 21

To Des Bosses (about 1712), however, Leibniz clearly writes that «Triangle

and Trilateral are the same being, but different terms: they differ formally,

not materially».22

Thus, in some texts Leibniz writes that terms like “triangle” and “trilat-

eral” differ formally, whereas in other texts, written at about the same pe-

riod, he plainly states that “triangle” and “trilateral” are only different ex-

pressions of the same formality or of an identical set of ideas. Analogously,

whereas in most of his writings Leibniz holds that the salva veritate princi-

ple provides a criterion for the identity of things, there are texts (General


Inquiries, for instance, as we have seen) in which he claims that terms like

“triangle” and “trilateral” are interchangeable salva veritate, because they

express the same idea (or ideas). All this can be easily explained if we take

into account that for Leibniz the existing world splits up, as it were, into

two different realms: that of (existing) things and that of the ideas, or

essences, corresponding to things. Both realms are “real” and each existing

thing has an ideal counterpart - an essence which, like the thing itself, is

one in number. The same essence, however, may be expressed by several


To reinforce the distinction between essence and definition, bear in

mind that although a thing has only one essence, this can be expressed by

several definitions, just as the same town can be represented by different

drawings in perspective depending on the direction from which it is

viewed. 23

In the same vein, as we have seen, Leibniz observes that «there are redun-

dant ways of expressing ideas, which add nothing to things».24 Thus, if, on

the one hand, different definitions of the same essence are not different

essences, but simply different ways of presenting one and the same essence,

on the other, a conceptual distinction does not correspond to any distinc-

tion among things.

In Leibniz’s logical ontology, terms considered as linguistic items ex-

press ideas or concepts, and denote things. Concepts and ideas are objec-

tive, non-linguistic in nature and independent of their expressions: they do

not exist in space and time, but they have a kind of existence in what Leib-

niz names “the realm of ideas” (regio idearum).25 Hence, insofar as Leibniz

tries to be coherent with his “provisional nominalism”,26 it is quite natural

that he should look at terms as directly denoting things; whereas if he em-

phasizes the “realistic” side of his ontology, he considers terms as repre-

senting first concepts or ideas. That the nominalistic mood is prevalent,

however, is easily shown by our text, where Leibniz, after having distin-

guished the formalities from the ways of considering them, states that, in

the last analysis, what really matters is “staying with things”.


Another element of interest in our text can be found in the second

passage between brackets, of which I offer a translation:

Thus rime and place are neither subjects nor attributes. And the same

holds for numbers and orders. Thus “ten” is not an attribute of any thing.

In fact the number ten cannot be said either of the aggregate or of the sin-

gle numbered things. The same holds for relations which are common to

the related things - for instance, the similarity of two things. Hence, there

are attributes which are at the same time in several subjects: of this kind

are, therefore, orders and even time and place.

The most relevant points of the entire passage are two: 1) Leibniz, after

having asked himself if there is a third kind of “things” besides subjects

and attributes, answers the question positively; 2) numbers and relations are

said to share some common feature, which determines their belonging to

this third kind of entities.

That numbers and relations have something in common is a claim

widely held by scholastic authors. Consider, for example, what Ockham

says in the following passage: «Similarity stays for (supponit) two similar

things considered simultaneously, as in the case of the name of a number

[...] Thus Socrates is not two, even though Socrates and Plato are two».27

Relying on this scholastic tradition, Leibniz thinks that numbers are neither

predicates of single things nor predicates of the aggregate (or set) of num-

bered things: they are attributes of a special kind, which, like relations «are

simultaneously in several subjects». What is striking here is that, at first

glance, Leibniz seems to recognize that relations (and numbers) belong to

an autonomous “third kind” of beings besides subjects (substances) and at-

tributes, contrary to his “official” doctrine that relations are not beings (en-

).28 On a more careful reading, however, we may attempt to maintain

some coherence on Leibniz’s part on this point. In fact, Leibniz does not

explicitly state that numbers and relations are beings (entia) - a conclusion

which plainly contrasts with his main ontological views. He writes that all

beings are substances or attributes; he asks himself if there is something

“third” besides substances and attributes and answers that numbers and re-

lations are this third kind of “thing”. Clearly, if the realm of all beings di-

vides itself into substances and attributes and if relations and numbers are

something “third”, in addition to substances and attributes, then relations

and numbers cannot be beings (entia) in the same sense in which sub-


stances and attributes are. And if they are attributes, they must be attributes

of a special kind.

In this case we are faced with a typical Leibnizian attitude about rela-

tions: on the one hand, Leibniz emphasizes that relations inhere simultane-

ously in several subjects;
on the other, he claims that because of that very

fact, they cannot be real attributes of things. As is well known, Leibniz

agrees with the scholastic thesis that the same accident cannot inhere in

things numerically distinct. Therefore, relations are not real accidents or

real properties, but “mere ideal things”, as we read in the fifth letter to

Clarke.29 Otherwise stated: relations do not inhere properly in things - their

kind of inherence is merely mental, a product of our thinking-together sev-

eral things at once. Thus, if Leibniz plainly recognizes the true logical na-

ture of relations - insofar as he recognizes their “multiple inherence” - this

happens at the expense, as it were, of their ontological reality. Relations

have a “diminished being” and are not real, as substances and accidents


A major element of interest in our text lies in the fact that here Leibniz

mentions, as a characteristic property of relations, “multiple inherence” and

states that numbers share with relations this same property. Clearly, insofar

as numbers inhere simultaneously in several subjects, they have a mere

mental nature as well. And, properly speaking, their “inherence” is not real,

but is due to our capacity to think-together a plurality of things in the same

act of thought. Chauvin’s Lexicon philosophicum helps us better understand

of what Leibniz says about numbers.31 Under the entry Numerus, Chauvin

writes that a number «says a plurality of unities» and that it implies a «si-

multaneity of the same unities» - i. e. that a number expresses a relation be-

tween our minds and a plurality of things. Therefore a number is made up

of matter and form: matter is constituted of «things which can be num-

bered, as, for instance, coins»; form is «the idea by means of which a plural-

ity of things is reduced to unity» by means of an act of the understanding.

Hence, whereas form is dependent on mind, matter is not. In this case too,

the analogy with relations is very strong: whereas for a (real) relation it is

necessary that some individuate exist and that the mind grasp them in an

act of thought, for the existence of numbers it is necessary that a plurality

of things (objectively) exist and that the mind have the possibility of grasp-

ing them in a single act of thought. As Chauvin observes - and surely Leib-


niz would agree - the form of a number is not something which adds itself

really to the numbered things. The idea which constitutes the form of a

given number is a modification of the mind of the person who is thinking -

it is not a modification of the numbered things. This form «may be named

an “extrinsic denomination”».32

This shows once more how deep the influence of scholastic (and late-

scholastic) doctrines is on Leibniz’s ontology and philosophy of logic.

Cf. GP II, p. 470.
Cf. GP VII, pp. 190-191.
Cf. A VI, vi, p. 77.
Cf. GP IV, p. 423.
GP IV, p. 424 and p. 450.
Cf. Ludovicus Carbo, Introductionis in Logicam, sive Totius Logicae Compendii Absolutis-

Libr. VI, Venetiis, apud Io. Baptistam et Io. Bernardum Sessam, 1597, p. 35: «Est ergo sup-

positio materialis illa qua terminus significat se ipsum, seu vocem; ut “homo est vox”, homo dici-

tur supponere materialiter, quia seipsum, seu vocem ipsam significat: quae suppositio reperitur in

vocibus etiam non significativis».
Cf. G. W. Leibniz, Allgemeine Untersuchungen über die Analyse der Begriffe und Wahrhei-

Lateinisch-Deutsch, Herausgegeben von F. Schupp, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1982, p. 2 (C, p.

VE 5, p. 1086. Cf. also here (same page): «Quicquid Subiecto inhaeret, formalitas dici po-

test, et denominatio».
Cf. A VI, vi, p. 486 (english transl. by P. Remnant and J. Bennett, Cambridge, Cambridge

University Press, 1981).
VE 5, p. 1086.
A VI, vi, p. 363 (english transl. by P. Remnant and J. Bennett).
Cf. B. Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz. Metaphysics and Language, Oxford-New York,

Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 123 ff.
VE 8, p. 1935 (C, p. 261).
G. W. Leibniz, Allgemeine Untersuchungen..., p. 34 (C, pp. 366-367).
Cf. M. Mugnai, Leibniz’s Theory of Relations, Stuttgart, F. Steiner Verlag, 1992, p. 147.
Cf. M. Mugnai, Leibniz’s Theory..., pp. 18 ff.
G. W. Leibniz, Allgemeine Untersuchungen..., p. 20 (C, p. 362); english transl. in: Leibniz,

Logicai Papers, ed. by G. H. R. Parkinson, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, p. 53.
A Vi, vi, p. 423 (english transl. by P. Remnant and J. Bennett).
GP II, pp. 470-71.
A VI vi, p. 294 (english transl. by P. Remnant and J. Bennett).
Cf. A VI, vi, p. 423.
On Leibniz’s use of the expression regio idearum cf. VE 7, p. 1461: «Ego soleo dicere esse

aliquid in regione idearum itaque spatium numericum videtur esse tantum consideratione quadam

existentiam in regione idearum, quasi in spatio aut tempore»).
On Leibniz’s nominalism per provisionem cf. Grua, p. 547 and M. Mugnai, Astrazione e

realtà. Saggio su Leibniz
, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1976, pp. 133 ff.; B. Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz,

p. 170 ff.
Ockham, Quodlibeta septem, ed. by J. C. Wey in Opera Philosophica et Theologica, New

York, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, vol. IX, 1980, p. 616.
Cf. M. Mugnai, Leibniz’s Theory of Relations..., pp. 18 ff.
Cf. GP VII, p. 401.
Cf. M. Mugnai, Leibniz’s Theory of Relations..., pp. 18 ff.
Cf. Stephanus Chauvin, Lexicon Philosophicum, Leeuwarden, 1713 (second edition) - Re-

printed: Duesseldorf, Stern Verlag, Janssen & Co, 1967, p. 444.

Massimo Mugnai . :

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