Roger S. Woolhouse

In the ‘New system of the nature of substances’1 of 1695, Leibniz pub-

licly announced his hypothesis that the ‘union of the soul with the body’ is

to be explained and understood in terms of a ‘mutual relationship, arranged

in advance’ between events in the soul and events in the body.2

A month or so afterwards, in the so-called ‘Third explanation of the

new system’3 he explained this ‘mutual relationship’, which he had then

come to call a ‘pre-established harmony’, in terms of two clocks which were

made ‘with such skill and accuracy that we could be sure that they would

always afterwards keep time together’.4

Some years later, in 1703, the Jesuit Réne Joseph de Tournemine, in the

course of his ‘Conjectures on the union of the soul and the body’,5 objected

that, as an account of that union, Leibniz’s hypothesis of pre-established

harmony is insufficient and just will not do. ‘For after all’, he said, ‘ corre -

spondence , or harmony , does not make a union [ union ], or essential connec-

tion [ liason essentielle] . Whatever parallels we imagine between two clocks,

even if the relation between them were perfectly exact, we could never say


that these clocks were united [ unies ], just because the movements of the

one correspond to the movements of the other with perfect symmetry’. In

the pre-established harmony, says Tournemine, ‘[t]here is, if you like, a per-

fect correspondence; but there is no real connection [ liason réelle ]’, there is

no ‘genuine union’ [ veritable union]. 6

About four years later Leibniz published a reply to Tournemine’s ‘Con-

jectures’.7 In it he conceded the core of what he took to be Tournemine’s

objection to him. What the pre-established harmony, as explained in terms

of the simile of the clocks was meant to do, Leibniz said, was ‘only to give

an explanation of the phenomena, that is to say of the relation we perceive

between the soul and the body’. And, in merely giving ‘an explanation of

the phenomena’, it was not meant to give an explanation of any ‘metaphysi-

cal union [ union métaphysique ]’ between the body and the mind. Such a

metaphysical union would be additional to the perceived phenomenal rela-

tion between soul and body, and it is not anything with which, so Leibniz

says, his pre-established harmony was meant to deal.8

The phrasing of Tournemine’s objection in terms of a ‘metaphysical

union’ of soul and body is Leibniz’s; Tournemine himself speaks rather

more informally, in terms of a ‘real connection’ or a ‘genuine union’. More-

over, Leibniz says nothing more here about what might be meant by there

being a ‘metaphysical union’ between soul and body, or about what the dif-

ference between there being or not being such a union might amount to.

But something more about what Leibniz was saying the pre-established

harmony did not provide emerged later, in the Theodicy , in retrospective

references he made to the exchange with Tournemine.

In the Theodicy , referring explicitly to the ‘metaphysical union’ of his

reply to Tournemine, Leibniz speaks of that union as one which would

make of the soul and the body a ‘suppositum’. And in a later passage he


again speaks of it as something which produce a ‘suppositum’, and also as

something which would make ‘a single person’.9

In recent discussions of the Leibniz-Tournemine exchange Robert

Adams glosses ‘suppositum’ as ‘complete individual substance’, and Donald

Rutherford understands it as something in which the soul and body form a

per se unity’ or a ‘composite substance’.10

In what he says to Tournemine, and in the Theodicy , Leibniz is not

completely clear about his attitude towards what he calls a ‘metaphysical

union’. The evidence is rather mixed whether he really thinks the idea

makes much sense, and whether much turns for him at that time on

whether or not the soul does make a single per se unity with the body.11

But, whatever his attitude towards it, Leibniz could not have been

clearer in replying to Tournemine that a pre-established harmony between

body and soul does not of itself mean that there is a ‘real metaphysical

union’ between the two, a union sufficient to make ‘a single person’, a per

unity of the body and the mind.

Commentators have discerned a change in Leibniz’s mind here, a

change in two connected respects. It has been suggested that at the time of

the ‘New system’ and earlier, in the 1680s, Leibniz was quite positively for

the idea that human beings are single, per se, substantial unities.12 And it has

been suggested that despite what Leibniz later conceded to Tournemine, he

nevertheless, at the time of the ‘New system’, thought that the pre-estab-

lished harmony does not merely amount to a ‘perfect correspondence’ be-


tween body and soul, but that it underwrites and is sufficient for the claim

that a person is a single entity, a per se unity.13

Recently, however, Marleen Rozemond has tried to resolve this ‘ten-

sion’14 between Leibniz’s earlier evident pride about the possibilities of his

hypothesis of pre-established harmony for explaining the ‘union of the soul

with the body’, on the one hand, and his relaxed candour to Tournemine

about its limits, on the other.

Rozemond suggests that between the time of the ‘New system’ and the

time of the reply to Tournemine there is no change of Leibniz’s mind about

the possibilities of the pre-established harmony. It is rather, in her view,

that there are different things at issue at the different times. One is the

question whether there is a ‘union’ of the soul and the body in the sense of

there being interaction and connection between them - she uses here the

analogy of a ‘union’ of a computer and the printer with which it is united.

The other is the question, not so much whether there is a union of this kind

of soul and body, but rather how or whether soul and body form a per se

, and make one thing - something which, despite their being con-

nected and united, the computer and its printer do not. Rozemond suggests

that at the time of the ‘New system’, when Leibniz puts forward the pre-es-

tablished harmony, ‘he routinely proposes it as a solution to the problem of

interaction rather than the problem of per se unity’. However, she says,

Leibniz took Tournemine ‘to be interested in the other issue, which con-

cerns the per se unity of the body-soul composite’.15

Despite her view that Leibniz’s earlier pride in the pre-established har-

mony is focussed on what it will do for union , Rozemond allows that he

might also, in a marginal and less optimistic way, have thought it provided

an account of unity too.16 But she does not allow that this would have been

justified, and she is critical of a suggestion of Adams’ that the pre-estab-

lished harmony contains features which would support the claim that a per-

son is a single entity, a per se unity.17

It seems to me that Rozemond’s distinction between soul and body

union and soul and body unity, is an immensely useful one for thinking

about the whole issue of the relation of mind and body in the thought of

the early moderns. But I think there is something to be said in support of


Adams’s suggestion and against her view that Leibniz was right to concede

to Tournemine that the pre-established harmony does not underwrite a

unity of, but merely a union between soul and body.

Before proceeding it is worth recording that Leibniz’s concession to

Tournemine, that a pre-established harmony between soul and body does

not amount to a ‘metaphysical union’ between them, perhaps misses what

Tournemine was looking for.

Tournemine’s objection was that all Leibniz has provided between

body and mind is correspondence but no real connection, and that what is

required is a ‘union which is not superficial but intrinsic’.18 Now I have al-

ready noted that the description of a ‘not superficial’ and ‘intrinsic’ union

of this sort as ‘metaphysical’, is Leibniz’ s gloss on the matter. And it must

be added that, when Tournemine counter-replies to Leibniz,19 he explicitly

and forthrightly says that he was not actually looking for something so

grand. The union he has in mind is not, ‘as he [Leibniz] claims, a meta-

physical idea’. What he wants, Tournemine says, is some account according

to which ‘[t]he body is really, physically united to the soul, more united

than are two perfectly identical clocks’.20

What Tournemine wants, as he explained in the first place, is ‘a princi-

ple which shows that there is between a certain body and a certain soul a

connection so natural, so essential and so necessary, that no soul other than

mine could animate my body, and no body except mine could be animated

by my soul’. He wants ‘a certain body [to be] united to a certain soul [...]

because it has an essential need of that soul in order to be maintained in an

arrangement which is suitable for human functions’. He wants it to be that

the soul is united with the body, ‘not only because the soul acts on the

body’, but also ‘because its action on the body is, on the one hand, so es-

sential to the body that without it it would not be a human body, and, on

the other, so specific to the soul that no other created thing could produce

it by its natural powers’. And, as he said of his own system, which he then

went on to expound, ‘my system sets up between the body and the soul not

a simple correspondence, but a genuine union, which is as real and perfect

as the union between a machine and the single spring which is able to make

it work’.21164

Given all of this, one might wonder whether Leibniz had really read

Tournemine’s initial article through before he replied to it.22 Tournemine’s

counter-reply certainly indicates that at any rate he thinks that Leibniz’s

talk of ‘a metaphysical union’ is somewhat off at a tangent.

The question whether Leibniz was right, as Rozemond contends, to

concede to Tournemine that pre-established harmony does not underwrite

‘metaphysical union’, or per se unity, is not, then, the only possible line of

investigation. One could also wonder, given a fuller reading of Tournemine,

whether the pre-established harmony actually does provide what he was

wanting - however that should be described.23 It is certainly true that the

conceptual resources and complexity of the hypothesis of pre-established

harmony go far beyond what is captured by the ‘Third explanation’ simile

of the two clocks, a simile which, quite possibly, represents the limits of

Tournemine’s knowledge of the matter. So it is perhaps not obviously out

of the question that the pre-established harmony, when fully detailed, does

provide something interestingly like what Tournemine, as properly under-

stood, was wanting all along.24

I shall shortly look at some of that further detail - not, however, with a

view to deciding whether it after all provides what Tournemine was really

wanting, but rather with a view to the question provoked by Rozemond, the

question whether the pre-established harmony can, after all, underwrite a

substantial, per se unity of soul and body.

Adams’s suggestion is that, to an extent, it can do this - specifically

when seen as a supplement to and support for a scholastic conception of

per se unity according to which a substantial unity is one whose constituents

are, ‘incomplete’ by themselves.25 Rozemond’s objection to this is that ‘the

conceptions of incompleteness found in Leibniz and the scholastics are very

different, and [...] the differences are crucial to the question of the unity of

corporeal substances.26

In expounding the scholastic account of how the body and the soul,

each one incomplete by itself, complete each other in substantial unity,


Rozemond explains that, for the scholastics, the soul needs the body and is

incomplete without it in that it ‘cannot exercise its functions without it’; for

them, she says, the soul ‘needs the body in order to exercise its functions’.27

To take one specific case, they thought, she says, that ‘the human intellect

cannot operate without the imagination [...] because it cannot understand

anything without forming images’.28 She contrasts this with Leibniz’s state-

ments to the effect that souls ‘are independent from body and causally self-

contained’, and that ‘the soul alone is the subject of its states and it oper-

ates entirely independently of the body’.29 She suggests, too, that Leibniz’s

talk of incompleteness, as in a letter to Damaris Masham, has a quite differ-

ent meaning from what it had for the scholastics. His explanation of why

Caesar’s soul does not exist apart from a body is different from their’s, for

it is spelt out to Masham simply in terms of the demand for richness and

perfection in the world.30

Adams is of the view that this explanation, which is ‘tantamount to de-

mands of the goodness of God’, is ‘surely not weaker than the natural apti-

tude that matter and substantial form have for each other according to

Suárez’, and Rozemond agrees that ‘if body and soul imply each other’s ex-

istence in virtue of God’s goodness the reasons for this mutual implication

are indeed very strong’.31 But she goes on to say that so far as the question

of the body and soul forming one thing is concerned, ‘these reasons are not

the right kind of reasons : there is nothing about these reasons that explains

how body and soul constitute a genuine unity’.32

In what follows, then, I want to make at any rate the beginnings of a re-

sponse to Rozemond and to offer some support to Adams. In doing so I

shall concentrate, as Rozemond does, on the question of the incompleteness

of the soul without the body, rather than that of the body without the soul.

I want to point out that there is more to say on Leibniz’s behalf about in-

completeness than he says to Masham, and that the pre-established har-

mony does provide something of what Rozemond calls the ‘right kinds of

reason’ for speaking of the incompleteness of the soul without the body.

We need to see, then, that the pre-established harmony has rather more

to offer than she acknowledges about respects in which the soul and the


body imply each other’s existence, and to begin to see this we need to re-

mind ourselves that the ‘Third explanation’ simile of the clock leaves out

much of the conceptual complexity of the pre-established harmony.

That simile as Tournemine reports it, says no more than that soul and

body in their pre-established harmony, are like two clocks which, first, tell

the same time, and, second, do so, not because there is some mechanism

connecting them, not because someone continually adjusts them, but be-

cause they have been reliably regulated in advance.

Leibniz’s important denial of any direct causality or ‘influence’ between

soul and body is certainly captured by this. His anti-occasionalist notion of

substances having their own complete natures and internal causality (their

own original constitutions’) is also, though less explicitly, captured. But

what is completely left out is something which is catered for by other,

fuller, accounts of the pre-established harmony - namely, that there are,

nevertheless, dependencies between soul and body, and that these are of an

internal and not merely external nature.

As a background to this, consider Descartes’s account in The Passions

of the Soul
of the relation between body and soul. As might naturally have

been expected, it is part of that account that some events in the soul (per-

ceptions of outside bodies, for example) have their causes in the body (the

effect of light on the retina), and that some in the body (our legs moving,

for example) are consequences of causes in the soul (our willing to walk).33

Now ‘telling the same time as’ is a symmetrical relation between the

two clocks. So, to mirror the asymmetrical causal dependencies between

body and soul such as were naturally recognised by Descartes, it would

need somehow to be built into the clock simile, and in a way that does not

renage on Leibniz’s denial of causal connection between the clocks, that

one clock strikes eight (for example) not merely when but because the other

does, while the other strikes one (for example) not merely when, but be-

the first does.

But how the clock simile might actually be developed is a secondary

matter. The important fact is simply that as it stands it really is not sophisti-

cated enough, for, as indeed one would have hoped, it is part of Leibniz’s

hypothesis of pre-established harmony, just as much as it is of Descartes’s

account, that there are asymmetrical dependencies between body and soul.

Of course, Leibniz does not explicate these, as does Descartes, in terms of

extensional, efficient causality. His appeal is, rather, to the intensional no-

tions of ‘representation’ or ‘expression’. So, in the ‘New system’, for exam-


ple, the ‘mutual relationship, arranged in advance’ between body and soul

is not simply a matter of their ‘keeping time together’, even though what

arises in the soul does ‘from its own original constitution’, and even though

what happens in the body is ‘according to the laws of the bodily mecha-

nism’.34 What more it is, is a matter of there being dependencies of each on

the other. On the one hand, what arises in the soul is as it is through its

‘representational nature (its ability to express external things which are in

relation with its organs)’; and, on the other hand, the parts of the body have

‘exactly at the right moment the motions which correspond to the passions

and perceptions of the soul’ and to the soul’s willing it to act.35

Now, that the soul represents the body and, in its turn, is expressed by it

goes some way to supporting the idea that for Leibniz, just as for the scholas-

tics, the functions of the soul, such as its sensitive and intellectual ones, ‘can-

not’, as Rozemond puts it, ‘be exercised in separation from the body’.36

Leibniz speaks more often of the soul’s representing the body. Indeed

it is, he says, the very ‘nature of the soul to represent the body’.37 Now it is

true that when Leibniz’s statements about the soul’s being independent of

the body provoked Simon Foucher and Damaris Masham into suggesting

that ‘the bodily organs serve no purpose, if the soul is self-sufficient’, his re-

ply is merely ‘that God wanted there to be more substances rather than

fewer, and he thought it best that these “modifications of the soul” should

correspond to something outside’.38 But all that Leibniz says about percep-

tion carries the implication of there being a conceptual unnaturalness in the

idea of a soul without a body.

As the word ‘represent’ implies, the relationship between the soul and

body is not a merely external one as is that of efficient causality. While it is

of the nature of the soul to represent or perceive the corporeal world it is

necessary that it does not represent it clearly and objectively, but, rather,

confusedly and from a point of view. Otherwise ‘there would be no distinc-


tion among souls’ and ‘each would be a divinity’.39 And this requirement of

confused or subjective perception is met by the soul’s having a body,

which, as it were, places it within the corporeal world. While the soul rep-

resents or perceives the whole corporeal world ‘it is an expression of the

phenomena of all other bodies in accordance with the relationship with its

own’.40 So, says Leibniz, even though ‘what happens to the soul is born

from its own depths’ and it does not ‘adapt itself [...] to the body’ with

which it is merely in harmony, nevertheless the soul is, in a sense, necessar-

embodied, and is ‘the form of its body’.41

So the pre-established harmony between soul and body does more than

provide a mere analogue to the external relation of efficient causality. It re-

places it with something different and richer. The relationship between the

perceiving soul and the body is an internal one. The soul is incomplete

without a body in that an understanding of its essential function of repre-

senting involves an essential reference to it.42

The cases where, rather than the soul’s representing the body, it is ex-

pressed by it, lend even more support to the idea that the functions of the

soul have an internal reference to the body, so that it would be incomplete

without it. There are two kinds of such case.

Of the most obvious kind are those which correspond to the Cartesian

cases where the soul acts causally on the body. Willing is an example. In will-

ing, the soul wants the body to act and, as a result, the body does act. Cases

like this are referred to in the ‘New system’ when, as quoted earlier, Leibniz

says that the parts of the body have ‘exactly at the right moment the motions

which correspond to the passions and perceptions of the soul’ when it desires

it to act. They are referred to again in his exchanges with Pierre Bayle where

Leibniz says that ‘[e]verything that ambition or whatever other passion pro-

duces in Caesar’s soul is also represented in his body’.43169

Asymmetical correspondences of this kind between soul and body sup-

port the idea that for Leibniz the soul requires the body and is incomplete

without it. For it is plainly Leibniz’s thought that the relationship between

the soul’s willing and the body’s acting is not the merely external and con-

tingent one it is for Descartes, who holds that the relation is causal. It is,

rather, internal and necessary. As the word ‘expression’ implies, it is clearly

Leibniz’s thought that will is ‘embodied’ in the bodily action. There would

be an abnormality, an unnaturalness, in the soul’s willing without being ex-

pressed. In willing it bears an internal relation to it and requires to be ex-

pressed by it.

Cases of the second kind in which the soul gets expressed by the body

show even more how the Leibnizian soul requires completion by the body.

For these are cases which go beyond the boundaries of Descartes’s causal

account of the mutual dependencies of the soul and the body.

It is a feature of Descartes’s picture of the relationship between soul

and body that the soul has, as it were, some ‘life’ apart from the body. For

him, pure abstract thought, unlike acts of will, has no causal effect on the

body (nor, of course, is it caused by it). So, for Descartes, not every mental

event has a corresponding bodily event which is to be explained or under-

stood by reference to it.44 But for Leibniz every mental event does have

some bodily event corresponding to it. For Leibniz, all aspects of the active

life of the soul require embodiement in and expression by the body.

Thus, Leibniz tells Bayle that ‘the body is so constructed the soul never

makes any decisions to which bodily movements don’t correspond’. ‘[E]ven

the most abstract reasonings’, he says, ‘having their place there, through the

symbols which represent them to the imagination’.45

Again, it must be stressed that the relation between abstract reasoning

and the corresponding ‘bodily movements’ is not a merely external one.

For, first, the bodily correlates are nothing like brain traces or somesuch -

rather they are written characters which express and embody the reasoning.

Secondly, the abstract reasoning requires to be expressed.46 ‘[W]e cannot’,

says Leibniz, ‘have abstract thoughts which have no need of something sen-


sible’. Indeed, as he goes on to say, this is an essential feature of the soul

and the body being in harmony: ‘If sensible traces were not required, the

pre-established harmony between body and soul [...] would not obtain’.47

In her exposition of the Scholastics’ account of the mind’s being in-

complete without the body Rozemond says that for them ‘the human intel-

lect [...] cannot understand anything without forming images’.48 It is quite

clear that this is no less the case for Leibniz, and that the pre-established

harmony offers more than she acknowledges of what, objecting to Adams,

she calls ‘the right kind of reasons [...] to explain how body and soul consti-

tute a genuine unity’.49


Adams: Robert M. Adams,Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (New York & Oxford,


CSMK: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, & Anthony Kenny

(trans. & ed.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge, 1985-91), 3


Garber: Daniel Garber, ‘Leibniz and the foundations of physics: the middle years’, The

Natural Philosophy of Leibniz
, ed. Kathleen Okruhlik & James R. Brown (Dor-

drecht, 1985), pp. 27-130.

M: H. T. Mason (trans. & ed.), The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence (Manchester &

New York, 1967).

RB: Peter Remnant & Jonathan Bennett (trans. & ed.), G. W. Leibniz: New Essays on

Human Understanding
(Cambridge, 1981).

Rozemond: Marleen Rozemond, ‘Leibniz on the Union of Body and Soul’, Archiv für

Geschichte der Philosophie
, 79 (1997), pp. 150-178.

Rutherford a: Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature (Cam-

bridge, 1995).

Rutherford b: Donald Rutherford, ‘Metaphysics: the later period’, The Cambridge Com-

panion to Leibniz
, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 124-175.

WF: R. S. Woolhouse & Richard Francks (trans. & ed.), Leibniz s 'New System’ and

Associated Contemporary Texts
(Oxford, 1997).

Wilson: Catherine Wilson, Leibniz’s Metaphysics(Manchester, 1989).

‘Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que de

l’union qu’il y a entre l’âme et le corps. Par M.D.L’, Journal des Savants (Paris), 27 June 1695, no.

23, pp. 294-300; 4 July 1695, no. 24, pp. 301-306 (Amsterdam edn vol. 23, pp. 444-462).
‘Système nouveau’, paras. 12, 14 (GP 4, pp. 483-484/WF, p. 17).
‘Extrait d’une lettre de Monsieur de Leibniz sur son hypothese de philosophie...’, Journal

des Savants
(Paris), 19 November 1696, no. 38, pp. 451-455 (Amsterdam edn vol . 24, pp. 687-693).
‘Extrait d’une lettre de Monsieur de Leibniz...’, para. 4/WF, p. 62.
‘Conjectures sur l’union de l’ame et du corps. Par le P. de Tournemine’, Journal de Tré-

voux: Mémoires pour l’Histoire des Sciences et des Beaux Arts
(Trévoux), May 1703, art. 91, pp.

864-875 (continued, as ‘Suite de conjectures...’, in June 1703, art. 106, pp. 1063-65).
‘Conjectures’, pp. 869-870/WF, pp. 147-149.
‘Remarque de Monsieur de Leibnits sur un endroit des Mémoires de Trévoux de mois de

Mars 1704’, Journal de Trévoux (Trévoux), March 1708, art. 35, pp. 492-496. Having noted that

Leibniz’s reply gives the date of Tournemine’s article not (as in note 5) as May 1703, but as

March 1704, it has been suggested that the reference is simply a mistake or is to the actual as op-

posed to the merely nominal date of the article’s appearance (see Adams, p. 295, n. 42; AG, p.

196; Garber, p. 110, n. 60; Rutherford a, p. 285, n. 23). The discrepancy actually stems from the

fact that there are two editions of the Mémoires de Trévoux. In the first, published in Trévoux it-

self, the bibliographical details of Tournemine’s article are as in note 5 above; whereas in the Pro-

testant, second, edition published in Amsterdam and evidently the edition Leibniz read, its details

are vol. 7, art. 16 (March 1704), pp. 231-239.
‘Remarque de Monsieur de Leibniz...’, pp. 493-494/WF, p. 250.
Tbeodicée : GP 6, p. 45/H, p. 69; GP, 6, p. 81/H, p. 104. The ‘metaphysical union’ of the

reply to Tournemine crops up also in a letter to des Bosses of April 1709 (GP 2, p. 371/L, p. 598;

see also Leibniz to des Bosses, 8 Sept 1709 (GP 2, p. 390), and Leibniz to de Volder, 19 Jan 1706

(GP 2, p. 281/L, p. 538-539). The wider topic under discussion is the Eucharist and Leibniz ma-

kes a link between ‘presence’ in that connection and the presence of the soul in the body - a link

which was hinted at in Leibniz’s reply to Tournemine (p. 494/WF, p. 250). Questioning whether

and in what sense souls can be said to be in the body. Leibniz says that some would say that the

soul is in the body in that it operates on it, or ‘speaking according to the new system of pre-esta-

blished harmony, that they are in a place only through correspondence’. However, he continued,

given a ‘real metaphysical union’ between the soul and the body, a union which, he remarked, fi-

gured in his reply to Tournemine, then it ‘can be said that the soul is truly in the body’. So a fur-

ther thing that ‘metaphysical union’ between the mind and the body amounts to is that, given it,

the mind not merely ‘acts’ on the body, or, better, is in pre-established harmony with it, but also

is ‘truly in’ it.
Adams, p. 298, n. 46; Rutherford a, p. 274; Rutherford b, p. 156.
See the discussion in Adams, pp. 295 f., Garber, p. 110, n. 60, Rutherford a, pp. 266, 273

ff., Rutherford b, pp. 156 f.
Adams, pp. 291-292, Rutherford a, p. 266.
Adams, pp. 292 f., Garber, p. 44., Rutherford a, pp. 270, 274.
Rozemond, p. 152.
Rozemond, p. 157.
Rozemond, p. 160.
Rozemond, pp. 152, 163-177.
‘Tournemine, ‘Conjectures’, p. 870/WF, p. 249.
Réponse du P. Tournemine’, appended (pp. 496-498) to ‘Remarque de Monsieur de

Leibnits’ (as in note 7 above).
P. 497/WF, p. 251.
‘Conjectures’, pp. 870, 874, 1063.
Cf. Rozemond, note 16.
Cf. Rozemond, note 16.
Leibniz’s remarks that souls ‘inherently express those portions [of matter] with which

they are united’ (A 6, 3, p. 240/RB, p. 240), and that ‘every created intelligence has an organic

body, whose level of perfection corresponds to that of the intelligence or mind which occupies the

body’ (A 6, 3, p. 307/RB, p. 307) certainly find an echo in some of what Tournemine (as quoted

above) says.
Adams, p. 294.
Rozemond, p. 165.
Rozemond, pp. 168, 175; see also p. 169.
Rozemond, p. 169.
Rozemond, pp. 172, 175.
Rozemond, p. 173. The reference is to Leibniz’s letter to Masham, 30 June 1704 (GP 3,

p. 356/WF, p. 214).
Adams, p. 294; Rozemond, p. 175.
Rozemond, p. 175.
Part 1 , paras. 18, 21, 23, 31, 41 (CSMK, vol. 1 , pp. 335-37, 340, 343).
‘Système nouveau’, para. 14 (GP 4, p. 484/WF, p. 18). Of course even a perfectly symme-

trical ‘telling the same time as’ relation between soul and body would cali from the pre-establi-

shed harmony for some notion such as ‘expression’ or ‘representation’. What, otherwise, could

‘telling the same time as’ mean’?
‘Système nouveau’, para. 14 (GP 4, p. 484/WF, p. 18).
Rozemond, p. 168.
GP 2, p. 171/L, p. 517; also GP 2, p. 58/M, p. 65; GP 2, p. 71/M, p. 87; GP 4,

p. 519/WF, p. 81; GP 4, p. 523/WF, p. 84; GP 6, p. 617/L, p. 649; GP 7, p. 410/L, p. 710.
Letters from Masham to Leibniz (3 June 1704) and Leibniz to Masham (30 June 1704);

‘Reponse de M.S.F. à M. de L.B.Z sur son nouveau système...’, Journal des Savants (Paris), 12 Sep-

tember 1695, no. 36, pp. 422-426; ‘Eclaircissement de nouveau système...’, Journal des Savants

(Paris), 2 Aprii 1696, no. 14, pp. 166-168, 9 Aprii 1696, no. 15, pp. 169-171.
Letter from Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687 (GP 2, p. 90/M, p. 113); Monadology

para. 60 (GP 6, p. 617/L, p. 649).
Letter from Leibniz to Arnauld, 4/14 July 1686 (GP 2, p. 58/M, p. 65-66; see also letter to

Coste, 4 July 1706 (GP 3, p. 383/WF, p. 135 n. 12), Monadology , para. 62 (GP 6, p. 617/L, p. 649).
Letter from Leibniz to Arnauld, 4/14 July 1686 (GP 2, p. 58/M, p. 65); also Monadology,

para. 62 (GP 6, p. 617/L, p.
See Wilson, pp. 197-198 for some discussion of this. A further way in which the hypothe-

sis of pre-established harmony goes beyond the Cartesian picture is, of course, that for Leibniz

everything that goes on in the body has some representation in the soul (Letter from Leibniz to

Arnauld, 9 October 1687 (GP 2, p. 112/M, p. 143).
‘Réponse de Mr. Leibniz [à] second edition du Dictionaire Critique de Mr. Bayle’,

Histoire Critique de la République des Lettres, art. 4, voi. 11, 1716. Quotation from GP 4,

p. 559/WF, p. 112.
I take it that this feature of Cartesian interactionism, that some mental events have no ef-

fect in the body, is taken over into Cartesian occasionalism. However, and perhaps invited to do

so by the clocks analogy, Tournemine appears not to notice this and explicitly says that the Carte-

sians hold that ‘to each change in the body there corresponds a change in the soul, and in the

same way to each change in the soul there corresponds a change in the body’ (‘Conjectures’, p.

866/WF, p. 247.
‘Réponse de M. Leibniz...’ (GP 4, p. 559/WF, p. 112; see also GP 4, p. 541/WF, p. 100,

GP 4, p. 563/WF, p. 117; A 6, 3, pp. 77, 116/RB, pp. 77, 116; GP 6, p. 532/L, p. 556).
See Wilson, pp. 263-264 for some discussion of this.
A 6, 3, p. 77/RB, p. 77.
Rozemond, p. 169.
Rozemond, p. 175.

Roger S. Woolhouse . :

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